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THE SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT PARODY MAY BE A
FAIR USE UNDER SECTION 107 OF THE 1976 COPYRIGHT
ACT Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994)
Lisan Hungt
INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 1994, the United States Supreme Court held in
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 1 that parody may be considered a
fair use under section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act,2 and that the
commercial character of song parody alone does not'create a presump-
tion against a finding of fair use.3 The Supreme Court had only once
before inquired into whether a parody may be considered fair use
under section 107; however, the Court did not decide the question be-
cause it was equally divided.
In Campbell, the Court explained that section 107" 'permits [and
requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster.' "I Parody, the court found, has a definite claim to
transformative value and thus may advance the purposes of the copy-
right law: to promote the development of science and the arts6 and to
stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter.7 Therefore,
the Court concluded that parody may be considered under section 107
for purposes of fair use.
BACKGROUND
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees composed a rock ballad
entitled "Oh Pretty Woman," and assigned the rights in that song to
Copyright © 1994 Lisan Hung.
t B.S. University of California at Berkeley, 1991; J.D. Santa Clara University School of
Law, 1994. Ms. Hung is an Associate at the law firm of Clapp, Moroney, Bellagamba, Davis
and Vucinich in Menlo Park, California.
1. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). The unanimous decision was written by Justice Souter, with a
concurring opinion filed by Justice Kennedy.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
3. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1179.
4. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom, Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
5. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1170, quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
6. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
7. See, id. at 1171 n.10.
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Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), producer of the song and re-
spondent in the action.' Acuff-Rose accordingly registered "Oh,
Pretty Woman" for protection under the copyright laws.9
Sometime in 1989, Luther Campbell, member of the rap group'0
2 Live Crew, wrote a song entitled "Pretty Woman" that intended to
satirize the Orbison original." 2 Live Crew's manager subsequently
contacted Acuff-Rose on July 5, 1989, and informed it that: 1) 2 Live
Crew had written a parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman;" 2) 2 Live Crew
would afford all credit for ownership and authorship of the original
song to Acuff-Rose, Dees, and Orbison; and 3) the rap group was will-
ing to pay a fee for the use of the Orbison original. 2 However, Acuff-
Rose refused to give permission to 2 Live Crew for such use of the
Orbison song.' 3
In June or July of 1989, 2 Live Crew nonetheless released
records, cassette tapes, and compact discs of their song "Pretty Wo-
man," in a collection of songs entitled "As Clean As They Wanna
Be.""4 In the collection, Orbison and Dees were identified as the au-
thors of the song "Pretty Woman," and Acuff-Rose was recognized as
its publisher. 5 2 Live Crew sold over a quarter-of-a-million copies of
the collection before Acuff-Rose made any judicial protest.' 6
In 1990, Acuff-Rose brought an action against the members of 2
Live Crew and its record company, Luke Skywalker Records, alleging
that 2 Live Crew's song, "Pretty Woman," was an infringement of
Acuff-Rose's copyright in the Orbison song "Oh, Pretty Woman."'"
As their defense, 2 Live Crew contended that "Pretty Woman" was a
parody that made fair use of the original song under section 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act'" and filed a motion for summary judgment. The
district court held that 2 Live Crew's song made fair use of the origi-
nal song and granted summary judgment in favor of 2 Live Crew.' 9
8. lI
9. l
10. The Court defined rap as a "'style of black American popular music consisting of
improvised rhymes performed to a rhythmic accompaniment.'" Id. at 1168 n.1 (quoting THE
NORTON/GROVE ENcYcLOPEDIA oF Music 613 (1988)).
11. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
12. l
13. Id.
14. I
15. Id
16. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
17. Id
18. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
19. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
The district court found fair use under section 107 in that 1) the commercial purpose of 2 Live
Crew's song was no bar to fair use, 2) 2 Live Crew's version of the song was a parody, 3) 2 Live
[Vol. 10
1994] CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded the decision of the lower court,20 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari2 ' in order to determine whether 2
Live Crew's commercial parody could be a fair use within the mean-
ing of section 107.22
HOLDING
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court concluded that the
court of appeals had erred on two accounts. First, the court of appeals
was incorrect in adjudging that the commercial nature of 2 Live
Crew's parody rendered it presumptively unfair.' The Supreme
Court explained that, "[n]o such evidentiary presumption'is available
to address either the first factor, the character and purpose of the use,
or the fourth [factor], market harm, in determining whether a trans-
formative use, such as parody, is a fair one."'24 Second, considering
that the use of the original was for parodic purposes, the court of ap-
peals erred by holding that 2 Live Crew had excessively copied from
the Orbison original.' The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the decision for further
proceedings consistent with their findings.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court stated that when evaluating the fair use fac-
tors of section 107,26 each of the four statutory factors must be ex-
plored and taken together into consideration, in light of the purposes
Crew had taken no more than was necessary to conjure up the original in order to parody it, and
4) it was extremely unlikely that 2 Live Crew's song could adversely affect the market for the
original. lId at 1154-55, 1157-58.
20. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439. The court of appeals con-
cluded that: 1) the parody was presumptively unfair because of its commercial nature under the
first of four factors in Section 107, 2) the rap group had taken too much under the third factor by
taking the heart of the original song and constructing it as the heart of the parody, and 3) the
parody's commercial use presumptively established market harm under the fourth factor. Thus,
the court of appeals determined that 2 Live Crew's parody was not a fair use of the Orbison
original. Id. at 1435-1438.
21. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 113 S. CL 1642 (1993).
22. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1169.
23. Id. at 1179.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 1TU.S.C. § 107, which reads, as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A [17 U.S.C.S.
§§ 106, 106A], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by repro-
duction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including mul-
tiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
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of copyright.' Doing so, the Supreme Court held that under section
107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 2 Live Crew's use through parody
of "Oh Pretty Woman" was a fair use that avoided encroaching Acuff-
Rose's rights in that song.28
A. The Purpose and Character of the Use
In examining the first factor of section 107 in determining fair
use-the "purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses"' 29- the Supreme Court concluded that "parody, like other
comment or criticism, may claim fair use under section 107.1'30 The
Court explained that the main purpose behind weighing the first factor
is to determine whether or not, and to what extent, a new work is
"transformative," and "parody has an obvious claim to transformative
value."31
The Court defined a transformative work as one that "adds some-
thing new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message."32 A work
that merely supersedes the objects of an original creation is not trans-
formative.33 The Court focused on the transformative value of a work
copyright. In determiningwhether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.
27. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
28. Id at 1179. The court noted that it was not challenged that 2 Live Crew's song would
be an infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106, but for a finding of fair use. ld at 1169. Section 106
reads, in part:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;...
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
30. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171. The court clarified that a parody need not be labeled a
"parody" in order to assert the fair use defense. Id. at 1173 n.17.
31. -Id at 1171.
32. A
33. IM
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because such facilitates the goals of copyright law by promoting sci-
ence and the arts.34 Transformative products, which may germinate
from original works, contribute to society by endowing upon it new
creations.35 Therefore, the Court resolved that "[a]lthough [a] trans-
formative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use...
the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use."36
The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals had erred
in applying a presumption "ostensibly culled from Sony,37 that 'every
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively . ..un-
fair.' "38 Instead, the CoUrt revealed that "[tihe language of the statute
makes clear that the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a
work is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose
and character."39 Therefore, in examining the first factor of section
107, all purposes must be considered and balanced.
With specific reference to parody, the Court asserted that parody
is transformative in that it "can provide social benefit, by shedding
light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one."'
For purposes of copyright law, the definition of parody is the "use of
some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one
that, at least in part, comments on that author's work."'" Therefore, a
parody, by its nature, must duplicate or imitate at least some portions
of an original in order to serve parody's end; this type of use may
qualify as fair use under section 107.
34. I& at 1171.
35. Whether the new work is a highly regarded piece or one held in disgust is not relevant
to determining transformative value. With specific reference to parody, the court stated that,
[wihether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or bad does not and should
not matter to fair use. As Justice Holmes explained, "[lit would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.
At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation."
Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1173.
36. 1& at 1171.
37. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
38. Campbell, 114 S, CL at 1173-74 (emphasis added).
39. l. at 1174. The court further explained that it had emphasized a need for a "sensitive
balancing of interest" in Sony. The court stated that "commercial or nonprofit educational char-
acter of a work is 'not conclusive' [citation], but rather a fact to be 'weighed along with other[s]
in fair use decisions.'" Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449).
40. 1l at 1172. Parody is generally described as a "literary or artistic work that imitates
the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule" or as a "composition
in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an'author or class of
authors are imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous." Il
41. l.
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However, the Court further explained that a work merely labeled
as a "parody" will not automatically be considered transformative. A
parody accepted as fair use of an original must have some critical
bearing on the substance or style of the original creation. a2 If a parody
merely uses an original as a means to gain attention or to bypass the
need for the alleged parodist's own creative thought, then the fair use
claim in using the original work wanes.4 3 Instead, other factors, such
as the extent of a parody's commercialism, must consequently be
given more weight.' Because there is no definite formula as to the
minimum amount of appropriation of an original requisite for a suc-
cessful parody, the Court concluded that each parody must be ad-
judged on a case by case analysis, with consideration of the purposes
of copyright law."
In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that it could be rea-
sonably inferred that 2 Live Crew's song made some comment on or
criticism of the Orbison original. The Court explained that when fair
use is used as a defense in parody, "[tjhe threshold question ... is
whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived."4 6 Accord-
ingly, it found that 2 Live Crew's song could reasonably be perceived
as a parody that commented or criticized the Orbison original in that,
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fan-
tasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex,
and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words
can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the original of an
earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness
of street life and the debasement that it signifies.47
42. Id. at 1174.
43. Id Because Parody must mimic the original to some extent in order to make the point
of the parody, the court acknowledged that parodies have some claim to use a creator's imagina-
tion. On the other hand, a satire need not rely upon the original creation. Therefore, in examin-
ing a satire, justification for borrowing from an original work would be required. Id.
44. Id
45. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174. The Court disagreed with 2 Live Crew's contention that
any parodic use is presumptively fair. Instead, the court explained that the 1976 Copyright Act
had "no hint of an evidentiary preference for parodists over their victims, and no workable pre-
sumption for parody could take account of the fact that parody often shies into satire when
society is lampooned through its creative artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodic and
non-parodic elements." Id
46. Id at 1173. The court added that, "[tihe only furtherjudgment... that a court may
pass on a work goes to an assessment of whether the parodic element is slight or great, and the
copying small or extensive in relation to the parodic element." Id. at n.16.
47. Id at 1173.
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Accordingly, 2 Live Crew's parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" was
a transformative use that could be considered as a fair use under the
first factor of section 107.48
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The Court next examined the second statutory factor of section
107, the nature of the copyrighted work.49 The Court explained that
consideration of this second factor "calls for the recognition that some
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish
when the former works are copied." 0  In other words, the value of
the original material used is influential in determining fair use.
In applying the second factor to the case at hand, the Court
agreed with the two lower courts in deciding that although the original
song's "creative expression for public dissemination falls within the
core of the copyright's protective purposes,"'" the second factor of
section 107 was of little help in the instant case or in future cases
involving parodied works.5 2 This conclusion was based on the
Court's recognition that "parodies almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works."5 3
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in
Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole
The third factor the Court weighed was whether "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole" 4 ... are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copy-
ing."55 This enquiry is linked to both the first and fourth55 statutory
factors, in that the extent of permissible copying varies with the pur-
48. Id.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
50. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
51. Id. at 1175. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals had made the same
decision.
52. Id
53. Id; see, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 at 237-238 (1990) (contrasting fictional
short story with factual works); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539 (1985) (contrasting soon-to-be published memoir with published speech); Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (contrasting motion pictures with
news broadcasts); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.,499 U.S. 340
(1991) (contrasting creative works with bare factual compilations).
54. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175. The court noted that this could be explained through
Justice Story's words in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841), as "the
quantity and value of the materials used." ia.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
56. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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pose and character of the use of that copying, and those facts will
show the degree to which the parody may serve as a market substitute
for the original or its potentially licensed derivatives.57
In the instant case, the Supreme Court decided that the court of
appeals was "insufficiently appreciative of parody's need for the rec-
ognizable sight or sound when it ruled [that] 2 Live Crew's use [of the
original was] unreasonable as a matter of law."58 The court of appeals
had determined that, when weighing the third statutory factor, a court
must consider the following: 1) the quality and importance of the orig-
inal materials used, in addition to the quantity of that material used,
and 2) whether a "substantial portion of the infringing work was cop-
ied verbatim" from the copyrighted work.59 Using these factors, the
court of appeals consequently concluded that since 2 Live Crew took
the heart of the original song and used it as the heart of its parodied
work, 2 Live Crew "purloined a substantial portion of the essence of
the original?"6°
While the Supreme Court agreed with the above considerations
for general purposes of the fair use analysis, the Court did not concede
to the application of that query to works involving parody, especially
to the parody at hand. The Court explained that:
Parody's humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs
from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation
.... When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the par-
ody must be ablei to "conjure up" at least enough of that original to
make the object of its critical wit recognizable. [Citations omitted].
What makes for this recognition is quotation of the original's most
distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure
the audience will know.6'
After the minimum amount necessary to secure identification of an
original has been appropriated, a court's examination of a parodist's
reasonable use will then depend on evaluation of the first and fourth
factors of section 107.62
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that, as to the lyrics of 2
Live Crew's song, "no more was taken [from the original] than neces-
57. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
58. Id. at 1176.
59. Id. at 1175-76. The appeals court felt that this latter query is relevant because it may
reveal a disputed work's transformative character or purpose under the first factor, or the extent
of market harm under the fourth factor because a "work composed primarily of an original,
particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use,
fulfilling demand for the original." Id. at 1176.
60. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1438.
61, Campbell, 114 S. CL at 1176.
62. Md.
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sary," even if the portion of the original taken was the heart of the
original.63 Albeit 2 Live Crew copied the opening bass riff, and the
first line of their song went to the heart of the original work, the Court
recounted that "the heart is also what most readily conjures up the
song for parody, and it is the heart at which parody takes aim. Copy-
ing does not become excessive in relation to parodic purpose merely
because the portion taken was the original's heart."' The Court ac-
cordingly concluded that the instant case is not "a case where the par-
ody is so insubstantial, as compared to the copying, that the third
factor must be resolved as a matter of law against the parodists. 65
In contrast, as to the music used in 2 Live Crew's song, the Court
expressed no opinion as to whether repetition of the bass riff was ex-
cessive copying, and remanded that issue to the lower court in order to
measure the amount taken under this third factor, with reflection also
of the fourth factor.6
D. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or
Value of the Copyrighted Work
The fourth factor in determining fair use is "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."'67
The Court asserted that when delving into the fourth factor, an exam-
ining court must consider not only the extent of the market harm
caused by the alleged infringer, but also " 'whether unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market' for the
original. '68 Thus, the inquiry must take into account both the harm to
63. lU. The court of appeals had suggested that "no more was taken than necessary" but
decided that the copying was excessive in relation to its parodic purpose because the portion of
the original taken was the heart of the original. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1438.
64. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1176.
65. Id. It is important to note that in reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court felt that
what 2 Live Crew had done beyond using the heart of the original was a significant determinant
in favoring a finding of fair use. First, the Court recognized that after 2 Live Crew copied the
first line of the original song, the group "departed markedly" from the original song to further
their own purpose. In addition, 2 Live Crew, after copying the bass riff and repeating it, also
produced their own distinctive sounds. For example, the group introduced "scraper" noises into
the music, overlayed music with solos of different keys, and altered the drum beat. Conse-
quently, as to the lyrics of 2 Live Crew's song, the Court concluded that no more than necessary
was taken from the Orbison original. Ia
66. Id. at 1176-77.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
68. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177 (quoting 3 MELvnza B. NIMaMR & DAVID NINMMR,
NIMMER ON CoPyMolr § 13.05[A][4], at 13-181-82 (1993)).
1994]
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the original and the harm to the market for derivative works.69 When
examining the harm to the market for derivatives, the particular harm
that this enquiry should focus upon is market substitution.70
In specific reference to parody, the Court settled that, in general,
parody, in its purest form, has no derivative market because of its
critical nature.71 However, the Court qualified this conclusion by ad-
ding that where a work may encompass elements of parody and other
elements that fall within a protectable market for derivative work, the
examining court then must evaluate the harm to the market for those
other elements.72
In view of the instant case, the Court asserted that because 2 Live
Crew's song incorporated not only parody, but rap music as well, the
derivative market for rap music would be a proper focus of inquiry.73
However, neither respondents nor petitioners introduced any affidavits
or evidence regarding the effect of the subject song on the market for a
non-parody, rap version of the Orbison original.74 The Court con-
69. 1 at 1177. The Court explained that harm to derivative markets is a proper focus
because the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of original
work. Il at 1178.
70. See, id. at 1177. If the parody is one that impairs the market for derivative uses of the
original work exclusively because its critical commentary is potent, then it is not the type of use
that is targeted by the copyright laws. The Court explains that this is because the effect of such
critical commentary is the same type of threat to the derivative market as to the original market.
Ila at 1178. The Court further recognized in note 24 that
[i]n some cases it may be difficult to determine whence the harm flows. In such
cases, the other fair use factors may provide some indicia of the likely source of
the harm. A work whose overriding purpose and character is parodic and whose
borrowing is slight in relation to its parody will be far less likely to cause cogniza-
ble harm than a work with little parodic content and much copying.
Id. at n.24.
71. Id. at 1177-78. The Court expressed that the role of the courts is to distinguish be-
tween "biting criticism that merely suppresses demand and copyright infringement which usurps
it." IL at 1177. A biting criticism, "like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original,
[but] does not produce a harm cognizably under the Copyright Act." Id. at 1178.
The market for potential derivative uses encompasses only markets in which the creators of
the original works would develop or license others to develop. The Court perceptively recog-
nized that it is unrealistic to believe "that creators of imaginative works will license critical
reviews or lampoons of their own productions:' Id. It is the nature of people to want only praise
of their creations. Thus, such critical uses of an original work do not fall within the realm of
potential licensing markets and therefore are not potential derivative uses. Id. As a general rule,
there is no protectable derivative market for criticism, and consequently no derivative market for
a work that is purely a parody. See id
However, as to the derivative markets for works making no comment on nor criticism of an
original, but using the elements of an original as vehicles for satire or amusement, the Court in
note 22 stated that they expressed no opinion as to those particular types of works. ItL at n.22.
72. IL
73. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178-79.
74. Id. at 1178. The Court noted that there was no evidence that a potential rap market
was harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew's parody-rap version. In doing so, the Court rejected
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cluded that it was therefore "impossible to deal with the fourth factor
except by recognizing that a silent record on an important factor bear-
ing on fair use disentitled the proponent of the defense, namely 2 Live
Crew, to summary judgment."7'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court disagreed with the court of
appeals' application of an evidentiary presumption against fair use in
assessing the likelihood of significant market harm. The court of ap-
peals, quoting the language from Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,76 had held that" 'if the intended use [of the origi-
nal] is for commercial gain, that likelihood [of significant market
harm] may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the
likelihood must be demonstrated.' ,77 Thus, the court of appeals had
erroneously concluded that because 2 Live Crew's song was wholly
commercial, a likelihood of future harm to the respondents could be
presumed.78 Instead, the Supreme Court declared that,
No "presumption" or inference of market harm that might find sup-
port in Sony is applicable to a case involving something beyond
mere duplication for commercial purposes. Sony's discussion of a
presumption contrasts a context of verbatim copying of the original
in its entirety for commercial purposes, with the non-commercial
context of Sony itself (home copying of television programming).
In the former circumstances, what Sony said simply makes com-
mon sense: when a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of
the entirety of an original, it clearly "supersedes the objects" [cita-
tions omittted] of the original and serves as a market replacement
for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original
will occur. [Citation omitted]. But when, on the contrary, the sec-
ond use is transformative, market substitution is at least less cer-
tain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.79
respondent Acuff-Rose contention that 2 Live Crew's rap parody and another rap group's en-
deavor to obtain a license to record a rap derivative of the original evidenced the existence of a
rap market and, ergo, harm to such market. L at 1178-79.
Moreover, the Court lectured that "since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent
would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence
about relevant markets." lt. at 1177. Therefore, "[in moving for summary judgment, 2 Live
Crew left themselves at just such a disadvantage when they failed to address the effect on the
market for rap derivatives, and confined themselves to uncontroverted submissions that there
was no likely effect on the market for the original." IdE
75. 14. at 1179.
76. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
77. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
78. I4
79. Id.
1994]
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Hence, the Court concluded that because parody and the original work
usually serve different market functions, parody does not affect the
market for an original for purposes of the fourth factor.8 0
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court concluded that parody may be
considered a fair use under section 107, and that the commercial char-
acter of parody alone does not create a presumption against a finding
of fair use. Instead, all four statutory factors of section 107 must be
taken into consideration together, with regard to the purpose of
copyright.
The importance of this decision is that the Court has allowed par-
ody to be placed in the category of works that are possible fair uses.
Thus, this finding will facilitate copyright's interest in stimulating the
creation of new works by allowing criticisms or reviews that normally
occur in the free marketplace to be evaluated for its transformative
value and not merely on its commercial effect upon the original."' As
the Court stated, "the role of the courts is to distinguish between biting
criticism that merely suppresses demand and copyright infringement
which usurps it." 2
The decision evidences support of coypright's enduring goal of
developing science and the arts and stimulating the creation and publi-
cation of edifying matter. It is a facilitation that should continue to
persist far into the future.
80. Id
81. See also, Henry R. Kaufman and Michael K. Cantwell, From a First Amendment
Standpoint, the 2 Live Crew Case Added 'Breathing Space' Into the Copyright Mix, NAT'L L. J.,
May 16, 1994, at C3.
82. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178.
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